Hofstra Law Review
Volume 36

Issue 2

Article 13

2007

Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from
Social Psychology
Andrew M. Perlman

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Perlman, Andrew M. (2007) "Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social
Psychology," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 36 : Iss. 2 , Article 13.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/13

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra
Law. For more information, please contact lawlas@hofstra.edu.

Perlman: Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social

UNETHICAL OBEDIENCE BY
SUBORDINATE ATTORNEYS:
LESSONS FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
Andrew M Perlman*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Consider the plight of a lawyer-fresh out of law school with
crushing loan debt and few job offers-who accepts a position at a
medium-sized firm. A partner asks the young lawyer to review a client's
documents to determine what needs to be produced in discovery. In the
stack, the associate finds a "smoking gun" that is clearly within the
scope of discovery and spells disaster for the client's case. The associate
reports the document to the partner, who without explanation tells the
associate not to produce it. The associate asks the partner a few
questions and quickly drops the subject when the partner tells the
associate to get back to work.
We would like to believe that the young lawyer has the courage to
ensure that the partner ultimately produces the document. We might
hope, or expect, that the lawyer will report the issue to the firm's ethics
counsel, if the firm is big enough to have one, or consult with other
lawyers in the firm, assuming that she has developed the necessary
relationships with her colleagues despite her junior status.
In fact, research in the area of social psychology suggests that, in
some contexts, a subordinate lawyer will often comply with unethical

* Associate Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., Yale College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School; LL.M., Columbia Law School. Several friends and colleagues have given me
valuable suggestions for this Article, including Lisa Aidlin, Thomas Blass, Robert Keatinge, Sung
Hui Kim, Jeffrey Lipshaw, and John Steele. I also benefited enormously from the assistance of
research librarian Ellen Delaney and from comments and questions during presentations at
Cumberland and Suffolk Law Schools and at the Hofstra Legal Ethics Conference. I also received
very useful insights from several students in my professional responsibility classes at Suffolk.
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instructions of this sort.1 This basic, but crucial, insight into human
behavior suggests that there is often a significant gap between what the
legal ethics rules require and how lawyers will typically behave. Indeed,
lawyers will too often obey obviously unethical or illegal instructions or
fail to report the wrongdoing of other lawyers.2
This Article explores what lessons we can learn from social
psychology regarding a lawyer's willingness to comply with authority
figures, such as senior partners or deep-pocketed clients, when they
make unlawful or unethical demands. Part II reviews some of the basic
literature in social psychology regarding conformity and obedience,
much of which emphasizes the importance of context as a primary factor
in predicting people's behavior.
Part III contends that lawyers frequently find themselves in the
kinds of contexts that produce high levels of conformity and obedience
and low levels of resistance to illegal or unethical instructions. The
result is that subordinate lawyers, like the attorney in the initial example,
will find it difficult to resist a superior's commands in circumstances
that should produce forceful dissent.
Part IV proposes several changes to existing law in light of these
insights, including giving lawyers the benefit of whistleblower
protection, strengthening a lawyer's duty to report the misconduct of
other lawyers, 4 and enhancing a subordinate lawyer's responsibilities
upon receiving arguably unethical instructions from a superior. 5 These
proposals, however, are ultimately less important than the insights that
underlie them. Namely, by gaining a deeper understanding of social
psychology, the legal profession can more effectively prevent and deter
attorney misconduct.
1. See infra Parts II and Ill. Although there is limited research on whether lawyers tend to

obey authority figures, there is no reason to think that attorneys are somehow immune from the
pressures that lead to obedience. See, e.g., infra note 80.
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2(a)-(b) (2007) (subjecting subordinates to
the Rules of Professional Conduct unless the supervisory lawyer's instructions reflect a "reasonable

resolution of an arguable question of professional duty"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R.
8.3(a) (2007) (requiring a lawyer to report another lawyer's misconduct if that conduct "raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer").

3. As explained in more detail in Part II, social context plays a significant role in human
behavior. See LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETr, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION xiv (1991)

("[W]hat has been demonstrated through a host of celebrated laboratory and field studies is that
manipulations of the immediate social situation can overwhelm in importance the type of individual
differences in personal traits or dispositions that people normally think of as being determinative of
social behavior.").
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2007).
5.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2007).
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II.

UNETHICAL OBEDIENCEBY SUBORDINATE A TTORNEYS

BASIC LESSONS FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ABOUT CONFORMITY
AND OBEDIENCE

Studies on conformity and obedience suggest that professionals,
whom we would ordinarily describe as "honest," will often suppress
their independent judgment in favor of a group's opinion or offer little
resistance in the face of illegal or unethical demands.6 These studies
demonstrate that we ascribe too much weight to personality traits like
honesty,7 and that contextual factors have far more to do with human
behavior than most people recognize. 8 Social psychologists have called
this tendency to overemphasize individual personality differences and
underestimate the power of the situation "the fundamental attribution
error." 9 Indeed, a number of experiments have amply demonstrated that
situational forces are often more powerful predictors of human behavior
than dispositional traits like honesty.
A.

FoundationalStudies on Conformity

The importance of context is apparent from a number of
experiments related to conformity, the most celebrated of which is a
1955 study by Solomon Asch.
Asch wanted to determine how often a group member would
express independent judgment despite the unanimous, but obviously
mistaken, contrary opinions of the rest of the group.10 To make this
determination, Asch designed a study involving two cards similar to
those shown on the next page. i

6. Although there is a growing legal ethics literature that draws on social psychology, there
is surprisingly little scholarship that draws on social psychology to explain the particular problem of
wrongful obedience among lawyers. For a few notable exceptions, see MILTON C. REGAN, JR., EAT
WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET LAWYER 307, 323-24 (2004); David J. Luban, The
Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS' ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND

REGULATION 94, 95 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 2000); Sung Hui Kim, The Banality of Fraud: ReSituating the Inside Counsel As Gatekeeper, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 983, 1001-26 (2005).
7.

See generally J01IN M. DORIS, LACK OF CHARACTER: PERSONALITY AND MORAL

BEHAVIOR (2002) (arguing that context explains far more about human behavior than individual
differences in character traits). For a detailed examination of the importance of context in
determining lawyer behavior, see REGAN, supra note 6, at 4-6, 10, 294-95, 302-04.
8.

ROSS & NISBETr, supra note 3, at 4.

9. Id.(citation omitted); see also DORIS, supra note 7, at 93.
10. Solomon E. Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, SCI. AM., Nov. 1955, at 31, 32.
11. Id.This image appears at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Asch-experiment.png (last
visited Jan. 20, 2008).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 13
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

A

B

[Vol. 36:451

C

In one version of the study, the experimenter told the subject that he
was about to participate in a vision test and asked the subject to sit at a
table with four other individuals who were secretly working with the
experimenter. 12
All five people were shown the two cards and asked to identify
which line in the card on the right (A, B, or C) was the same length as
the line shown in the card on the left. 13 Each person was asked his
opinion individually and answered out loud, 14 with the subject of the
experiment going near the end. 15 After each person had answered, a new
set of cards was
produced, and the participants were once again asked
6
their opinions.'
During the initial rounds, all of the confederates chose the
obviously right answer. 17 Not surprisingly,
under this condition, the
18
subject also chose the right answer.
In some subsequent rounds, however, Asch tested the subject's
willingness to conform by prearranging for the confederates to choose
the same wrong answer. 19 Even though the four confederates were
obviously mistaken, subjects of the experiment nevertheless provided

12.
13.

Asch, supra note 10, at 32.
Id.

14. Id. All of the subjects were male college students. Subsequent work has revealed that
women are, under certain circumstances, even more susceptible to conformity than men. See, e.g.,
Alice H. Eagly & Carole Chrvala, Sex Differences in Conformity: Status and Gender Role
Interpretations, 10 PSYCHOL. OF WOMEN Q. 203, 217 (1986).

15. Asch, supra note 10, at 32.
16. Id.
17.

Id.

18. Id.
19. Id.
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the same wrong answer as the confederates 35.1% of the time,2 ° with
70% of subjects providing the wrong answer at least once during the
experiment.2 1
Most importantly, Asch found that the introduction of certain
variables dramatically affected conformity levels. For example, Asch
found that conformity fell quickly as the confederate group size dropped
from three (31.8% of the answers were wrong) to two (13.6% were
wrong) to one (3.6% were wrong), but did not increase much in groups
larger than seven (maxing out at about 37%).22 Moreover, conformity
fell by more than 50% in most variations of the experiment when one of
23
the confederates dissented from the group opinion.
Not surprisingly, other studies have shown that conformity levels
increase when (as is true in the law) the answer is more ambiguous. For
example, in studies pre-dating Asch's, Muzafer Sherif placed a subject
in a dark room and asked the person to look at a projected spot of light
and guess how far it moved.24 Notably, the light did not move at all, but
only appeared to move due to an optical illusion called the autokinetic
effect.25 The precise extent of the perceived26 movement was thus
impossible for subjects to determine objectively.
In one variation of the experiment, a subject gave individual
assessments and was subsequently put in a room with a confederate,
whose opinion intentionally varied from the subject's. 27 As expected, the
subject's assessments quickly came into line with the confederate's or
(when the subject was placed in a group) with the group's. 28 Thus, Sherif
found that questions with ambiguous answers tended to produce more
conformity, because people were understandably less certain of their
original assessments.
The Asch and Sherif studies offer compelling evidence-also
supported by more recent experiments-that a group member's opinion
20. Id. at 35.
21.

PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT: UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN

EVIL 263 (2007). Some subjects always went along with the wrong answer, while other subjects
never chose the wrong answer. Still others chose the wrong answer occasionally. Overall, though,
the "wrong" answer was given thirty-five percent of the time. Asch, supra note 10, at 33, 35.
22. Asch, supra note 10, at 35.
23. Id. at 34-35.
24.

MUZAFER SHERIF, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL NORMS 95-96 (1973).

25. Id.at 91-92.
26. Id.at 92.
27. Id. at 93.
28. Id. at 100-08; see also Muzafer Sherif, A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception, in
27 ARCHIVES OF PSYCHOLOGY 5, 32-41 (R.S. Woodworth ed., 1935).
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is easily affected by the group's overall judgment.29 Critically, the
studies also reveal that this effect varies considerably, depending on
situational variables, such as the level of ambiguity in the assigned task,
the number of people in the group, the status of the person in the group
(e.g., high status people feel more comfortable offering a contrasting
view), and the existence of dissenters. 30 The situation, in short, has a
powerful effect on human behavior.
B. FoundationalStudies on Obedience
Not long after Asch's provocative study, Stanley Milgram focused
on a different but related question: When will31 people follow the
unethical or immoral orders of an authority figure?
The answer turned out to be both surprising and alarming. Milgram
found that, under the right conditions, an experimenter could
successfully order more than sixty percent of people to administer
painful and dangerous electric shocks to an innocent, bound older man
with a heart condition, despite the man's repeated pleas to be let go.32
These results came out of Milgram's brilliantly staged and oft-cited
experiment. It typically 33 began with a subject and a secret accomplice
of the experimenter drawing lots to determine who would be a "teacher"
and who would be a "learner" in a study that the subject believed to be
about the learning process.34 In fact, the experiment had nothing to do
with learning theory, and the drawing was "rigged so that the
subject
35
learner."
the
always
accomplice
the
and
teacher
the
always
was
The teacher (the subject) and the learner (the accomplice) were then
taken to another room where the teacher watched the experimenter
connect electrical wires to the learner. 36 The experimenter explained that
29. Ross & NISBETr, supra note 3, at 33 (explaining that "studies [have] demonstrated again
and again that arbitrarily constructed groups, even ones that hold no long-term power to reward
conformity or punish dissent, can exert potent conformity pressures").
30. Id. at xiv (noting that "what has been demonstrated through a host of celebrated laboratory
and field studies is that manipulations of the immediate social situation can overwhelm in
importance the type of individual differences in personal traits or dispositions that people normally
think of as being determinative of social behavior").
31. For a discussion of the differences between conformity and obedience, see infra Part III.
32.

STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 55-57, 60

(1974).
33. Milgram conducted many versions of this experiment, but the variation described here is
among the most commonly described.
34. MILGRAM, supra note 32, at 18-19.
35. Id. at 19.
36. Id.
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the teacher was soon going to have to ask the learner a series of
questions and that, after each wrong answer, the teacher was going to
have to administer an electric shock through the attached wires using a
37
generator in another room.
After the experimenter applied a gel that was supposed to help the
electrical current flow to the learner without causing blistering or
burning,38 the learner (in one version of the study) informed the
experimenter and the teacher that he had a heart condition. 39 The
experimenter explained that, although the shocks might be painful, they
would not be dangerous.40 While in the teacher's presence, the
experimenter then strapped the learner to a chair to ensure that he could
not break free. 41 The teacher/subject was subsequently brought back to
the original room and placed in front of the electric shock generator.42
The experimenter instructed the teacher to ask the learner questions
through an intercom (the subject could not see the learner in this
variation of the experiment) and to shock the learner for each wrong
answer, starting with 15 volts. 43 With every additional wrong answer, the

experimenter explained that the teacher had to increase the shock by one
increment on the generator, with each increment producing an extra 15
volts of electricity. 44 The generator, which was clearly marked, went as
high as 450 volts. 45 At 375 volts, the generator read: "Danger: Severe

Shock," and between 435 and 450 volts, the generator's label simply
46
indicated "XXX.

Unbeknownst to the teacher, the learner was not actually attached
to the generator and was instructed to provide numerous wrong answers
through a nearby key pad.47 Milgram's objective was to measure how
long the teachers would continue to follow the experimenter's orders to
apply the shocks.48
In the initial stages, nearly all of the subjects/teachers willingly
applied the lowest level of shocks on the generator. But as the
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.at

41.

Id. at 19.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 3.
Id. at20-21,28.
Id.
at 20-21.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. at 19-20, 22.
Id. at 23-24, 26.

19-21.
19.
55-57.
56.
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experiment continued, the learner/confederate produced increasingly
loud and forceful objections to the experiment, including (as time went
on) requests to be let out of the experiment and complaints about heart
pain.49 Eventually, the learner refused to answer and became ominously
silent. 50 The subject, of course, had no idea that these objections and
protests were pre-recorded and played at precise points during the
experiment.
Despite the learner's pleas to be released, his complaints about
heart pain, his refusals to answer, and his eventual silence, Milgram
found that the majority of subjects complied with the experimenter's
instructions fully, including repeated applications of the 450 volt shock
lever. A startling sixty-five percent of subjects obeyed the instructions to
the bitter end in this scenario.51
Critically, Milgram, like Asch and Sherif before him, found that
context was essential. Obedience varied a great deal depending on a
number of situational factors, such as whether the learner was in the
same room as the teacher, 52 whether the person issuing the orders was in
the same room as the teacher,53 whether subjects assisted a confederate
with the shocks instead of administering the shocks themselves, 54 and
whether someone dissented (such as when the experiment occurred in a
group setting).55
Milgram's findings have been replicated throughout the world, with
similar results in both genders, different socioeconomic groups, and
different countries.56 Moreover, because of new ethics guidelines that
make Milgram's work difficult to reproduce today,57 his work still stands
as one of the most significant contributions to our understanding of
human obedience to authority. We know from his work that, given the
49.
50.
5 1.

Id. at 22-23, 56-57.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 60. In fact, compliance levels varied and were even higher in other versions of the

experiment. Id. at 35, 60-61, 119.
52.

Id. at 34-36.

53. Id. at 59-60, 62.
54. Id. at 119, 121-22.
55. Id. at 118-21.
56. Id. at 5, 170 (socioeconomic groups), 62-63 (gender), 170-71 (international replications).
57. SHELLEY E. TAYLOR ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 228 (11th ed. 2003). There are also
other reasons to expect that a similar experiment could not be fully replicated today, including the
increasing sophistication of subjects and the expense of such work. See David J. Luban, Milgram
Revisited, 9 RESEARCHING L. (Am. B. Found., Chi., Ill.), Spring 1998, at 1, 6. Nevertheless, a
partial replication was recently conducted and produced results very similar to Milgram's. Jerry
Burger,
Replicating
Milgram,
APS
OBSERVER,
Dec.
2007,
available
at
http://www.psychologicalscience.org/observer/getArticle.cfm?id=2264.
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right situation, most people will follow orders that they would ordinarily
consider blatantly immoral.
C. The Powerof the Situation
The basic point of these studies is not that people are social
conformists, mindless followers of authority, or latent sadists. Indeed,
the studies do not suggest that "people are disposed to obey authority
figures unquestioningly.5 58 Rather, the point is that "manipulations of
the immediate social situation can overwhelm in importance the type of
individual differences in personal traits or dispositions that people
normally think of as being determinative of social behavior., 59 As a
result, "subtle features of... [the] situation... prompt[]
ordinary
60
members of our society to behave.., extraordinarily.
The importance of context is clear. Asch's studies showed that a
single variable, such as reducing the number of people in the group or
introducing a dissenting group member, could dramatically reduce
conformity levels. 6' Milgram also found that the existence of a dissenter
could reduce obedience and that other factors, such as placing the
experimenter outside of the room or moving the "learner" into the same
room as the subject, produced a similar effect.62 Social psychologists, in
short, have found that conformity and obedience are heavily contextdependent and that social forces play a much greater role-and
dispositional traits a much weaker role-in determining human behavior
than most people assume.
III.

SITUATIONAL CONFORMITY AND OBEDIENCE: IMPLICATIONS FOR
LAWYER BEHAVIOR

Conformity and obedience are different in subtle but important
ways. According to Milgram, "[o]bedience to authority occurs within a
hierarchical structure in which the actor feels that the person above has
the right to prescribe behavior. Conformity regulates the behavior among
those of equal status .... ,,63 So, for example, the discovery hypothetical
primarily implicates issues of obedience, because a superior is issuing an

58.

Ross & NISBETT, supra note 3, at 58.

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at xiv.
Id. at 56.
See supranotes 10-30 and accompanying text.
MILGRAM, supranote 32, at 34-36, 59-60, 62.
Id. at 114.
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order to a subordinate. The hypothetical would implicate conformity if
the young lawyer saw her colleagues at the firm concealing "smoking
guns" and consequently followed their lead without being instructed to
do so. Despite the differences in the two concepts, both of them can exist
in many law practice settings.
A. SituationalFactorsthat ProduceConformity in Law Practice
Recall that numerous factors contribute to conformity, including the
size of the group, the level of unanimity, the ambiguity of the issues
involved, group cohesiveness, the strength of an individual's
commitment to the group, the person's status in the group, and basic
individual tendencies, such as the desire to be right and to be liked.64
Many of these factors frequently exist in law practice.65 For
instance, lawyers often have to tackle problems that contain many
ambiguities of law and fact. Even questions that, at first, seem to have
well-settled answers are often susceptible to an analysis that can make
the answers seem unclear. Indeed, law students are trained to perform
66
this particular art of legal jiu jitsu.

Given the uncertainty of many legal answers and lawyers' expertise
in identifying (or manufacturing) those uncertainties, lawyers are
especially susceptible to the forces of conformity. For example, the
subordinate in the initial discovery hypothetical may review the
discovery rules and find language that could theoretically (though
implausibly) support the partner's position, particularly if she perceives
that other lawyers at the firm are engaging in similar behavior.6 7 Thus,
despite her initial belief about the document's discoverability, she might
begin to believe that her original view was either a product of
inexperience or a failure to appreciate fully all of the nuances about how
discovery works in practice.68 She might consequently come to think that
64.

See supranotes 22-30 and accompanying text.

65. Obviously, law practice occurs in a wide range of environments, and each setting
produces its own constraints and social forces that profoundly influence attorney behavior. See
generally Andrew M. Perlman, A Career Choice Critique of Legal Ethics Theory, 31 SETON HALL
L. REv. 829 (2001). Thus, the analysis offered here is not universally applicable.
66. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 591, 595-96 (1982).
67. Again, obedience and conformity are related, but distinct, forces. Technically, conformity
is an effect that occurs in groups, whereas the original hypothetical primarily concerns obedience.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
68. One recent study suggests that the social forces that produce conformity actually affect
one's subjective perception of a situation and do not simply push someone to conform for the sake
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her initial view was wrong, even though it was quite clearly right. And if
the document's discoverability fell into an area that was even slightly
of black and white, the tendency to conform would be even
grey instead
69
greater.
The hierarchical structure of lawyering also makes conformity more
likely. Studies suggest that strong conformity forces exist even in
"arbitrarily constructed groups... that hold no long-term power to
reward conformity or punish dissent." 70 Lawyers, however, work in
groups that are not arbitrarily constructed and actually do hold long-term
power to reward conformity or punish dissent. Attorneys typically work
in settings where other group members, such as senior partners or
corporate executives (e.g., in-house counsel jobs), control the
professional fates of subordinates, a condition that increases the
likelihood of conformity. 7' So, for example, the young lawyer in the
initial hypothetical would feel a powerful, though perhaps unconscious,
urge to conform, especially given that she had trouble finding a job and
faced significant financial burdens.
Social status also affects conformity. There is evidence that people
with more social prestige feel more comfortable deviating from the
72
prevailing opinion. By contrast, a person with a lower status, such as
the junior law firm associate in the hypothetical, will be more likely to
conform to protect her more vulnerable position.
Unanimity also encourages conformity, and unanimity is common
among lawyers who are working together on the same legal matter.
Studies have shown that zealous advocacy tends to make lawyers believe
that the objectively "correct" answer to a legal problem is the one that
just so happens to benefit the client.73 This tendency causes teams of
of fitting in with the group. Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social
Conformity and Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 245, 251
(2005). For a useful summary of the experiment, see ZIMBARDO, supra note 21, at 264-65. The
study implies that the associate may truly believe that the partner is right and will not consciously
recognize that she is engaging in an act of conformity.
69. See, e.g., Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054
(Wash. 1993).
70. ROSS & NISBETT, supranote 3, at 33.
71. See Perlman, supra note 65, at 834-39; see also Kim, supra note 6, at 1005-06, 1008
(describing the particularly strong social forces that act on in-house counsel).
72. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent 12 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law
& Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 34, 2002), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/resources/34.crs.conformity.pdf; see also Sherif,
supra note 28, at 42.
73. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A BehavioralInquiry Into
Lawyers'Responsibilityfor Clients'Fraud,46 VAND. L. REV. 75,95-111 (1993).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 13
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:451

lawyers to agree on many issues, making it even more difficult for
dissenting voices to be heard. So in the discovery example, the absence
of a dissenting voice would make the subordinate more likely to assume
that her initial position was incorrect or, at the very least, not worth
pursuing.
The point here is not that lawyers will always conform to the views
of superiors or colleagues. Plenty of lawyers express their own beliefs,
even under very difficult circumstances.74 The claim is that powerful
social forces exist in many law practice settings that make conformity
more likely than most people would expect.
B. SituationalFactorsthat Produce Obedience in Law Practice
Law practice also tends to produce excessive obedience. To
understand why this happens, consider just a few of the key variables
that affected obedience in Milgram's experiments: (1) the existence of a
plausible legitimate reason for the wrongful conduct (in Milgram's
experiment, it was to study the learning process); (2) the use of positive
language to describe the negative behavior (e.g., the shocks help the
person to learn); (3) the presentation of rules that, on their face, seem
benign (e.g., hit the lever when the learner gives a wrong answer); (4)
the creation of some kind of verbal or contractual obligation to help
(e.g., the experimenter asked participants to agree to follow certain
procedures before starting the experiment); (5) the assignment of
specific roles (e.g., teacher/learner); (6) the physical separation of the
person carrying out the orders and the victim (e.g., the learner being in
an adjoining room); (7) the close proximity of the person issuing the
orders and the person following them (e.g., the experimenter being in the
same room as the subject); (8) the blurring of responsibility or the
assignment of responsibility to someone else (e.g., when a subject asked
the experimenter who was responsible for the fate of the bound man, the
experimenter told the subject that the experimenter, not the subject, was

74.

See, e.g., Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 (2d Cir.

1974) (describing a junior associate who resigned from his job and reported his firm's misconduct
to the Securities and Exchange Commission); Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to
Ban the Abuse and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32, 32
(describing Alberto Mora's defiance of his superiors in an attempt to stop the torture of detainees at
the Guantanamo Bay prison); Douglas McCollam, The Trials ofJesselyn Radack, AM. LAW., July 1,
2003, at 19-21 (describing Jesselyn Radack's defiance of superiors in the Justice Department
regarding the Department's tactics in questioning John Walker Lindh, the so-called American
Taliban).

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol36/iss2/13

12

Perlman: Unethical Obedience by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social
2007]

UNETHICAL OBEDIENCE BY SUBORDINATE ATTORNEYS

responsible); (9) the incremental nature of the experiment (e.g., starting
with only fifteen volts and increasing the shocks by small increments);

(10) the social prestige of the setting (e.g., Milgram's initial experiment
occurred in a laboratory at Yale University); 75 and (11) the elimination
of dissent (e.g., Milgram found that, when the experiment was done in
groups, the presence of a dissenter dramatically reduced obedience). 7

Many of these factors exist in law practice. First, lawyers can
usually frame unethical or illegal requests in ways that fit the first and
second factors. For example, the partner who requested the withholding
of the smoking gun document could articulate a legitimate reason for the
request, such as "it's not within the scope of discovery" or "it's arguably
privileged," even though neither statement is objectively accurate. The

partner could also explain that withholding the document will produce
the salutary effect of promoting zealous advocacy and advancing the
client's cause. In these ways, the authority figure-in this case, a
partner-could give the subordinate a seemingly plausible explanation

for refusing to disclose the document and argue that it promotes a
positive outcome (factors one and two respectively).
The partner could also frame the instruction as part of litigation's
unwritten "rules of the game" (factor three). 7 In this way, the demand
appears entirely benign. Moreover, the consequences may also appear
inconsequential. Unlike Milgram's experiments, where obedience
resulted in painful electric shocks to a man with a heart condition,

75. Obedience levels dropped when Milgram moved the experiment to a rundown office
building unaffiliated with Yale. MILGRAM, supranote 32, at 66-70 (noting a reduction in obedience
from sixty-five percent to forty-eight percent when the study was moved from Yale to a rundown
office building that had no apparent ties to the University). Although Milgram's particular results
were not statistically significant, subsequent studies reveal that the status of the authority figure is a
factor that influences obedience. ZIMBARDO, supranote 2 1, at 275-76.
76. Social psychologists have offered many explanations for Milgram's results, but the
explanations described here are some of the most common. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 21, at 27375. For a slightly different list, see Philip G. Zimbardo, A SituationistPerspective on the Psychology
of Evil: Understanding How Good People Are Transformed into Perpetrators, in THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 21, 27-28 (Arthur G. Miller ed., 2004).
77. See, e.g., Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Assoc. v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054,
1074-85 (Wash. 1993) (remanding the case for the imposition of sanctions on attorneys who had
abused the judicial process by failing to disclose a smoking gun document in discovery); see also
Kimberly Kirkland, Ethics in Large Law Firms: The Principleof Pragmatism, 35 U. MEM. L. REV.
631, 718-19, 724 (2005) (concluding from her study of large law firm litigators that they frequently
"view zealous advocacy as an affirmative moral obligation" and view the ideal of litigation as "a
game well-played").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2007

13

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2007], Art. 13
HOFSTRA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 36:451

compliance in many (but not all) 78 lawyering contexts produces far less
dire consequences. For instance, in the discovery example, the lawyer is
"merely" withholding a document as part of the discovery "game" that
all lawyers play, 79 not causing somebody physical pain or risking
someone's life. The seemingly benign nature of the request can enhance
the subordinate's willingness to obey.
This factor is likely to have more weight if the subordinate has little
litigation experience and does not have the necessary expertise to
question the partner's authority. In contrast, if the subordinate has
handled numerous document productions and has a strong experiential
basis to know that the partner's request is impermissible, the subordinate
is less likely to give the partner's demand a benign gloss. Of course,
even when it is absolutely clear that the partner's behavior is unethical or
illegal, the subordinate may still comply if some of the other factors
favoring obedience are present. 80
Factors four (an agreement to help the authority figure) and five
(the presence of assigned roles) also frequently exist in law practice. The
lawyer-client relationship itself is essentially an agreement to help
clients achieve their goals (factor four). When combined with the
common perception that a lawyer's morality is distinct from individual
morality (i.e., role differentiation),8 1 lawyers are more apt to view
78. See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, 584 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ill. 1991) (describing the firing of an inhouse counsel after he warned the company's president that one of the company's products could
cause "death or serious bodily harm to patients").
79. Discovery is a "game" in both an academic and layman's sense. From an academic
perspective, discovery has an interesting game theory dimension. For a very nice discussion of
game theory's implications for discovery in the context of a subordinate lawyer, see David
McGowan, Politics, Office Politics, and Legal Ethics: A Case Study in the Strategy ofJudgment, 20
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1057, 1071-75 (2007). But discovery is also a game in the more ordinary
sense of the word. Namely, lawyers frequently think of the process not so much as a method for
discovering the truth, but as a game that needs to be won. See generally Robert L. Nelson, Essay,
The Discovery Process as a Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic
Factors that Contribute to Unreasonable,Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in CorporateLitigation,
67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773, 794-95 (1998).

80. For a recent real world illustration of this effect, see Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp.,
No. 05cv1958-B, 2008 WL 66932, at *13 n.10 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008); see also REGAN, supra note
6, at 4-6, 294, 323-24 (emphasizing the role that social context played in a lawyer's failure to
disclose pertinent information); Lawrence J. Fox, I'm Just an Associate... At a New York Firm, 69
FORDHAM L. REV. 939 (2000) (offering a realistic account of a subordinate who is asked to bury
discovery documents); Luban, supra note 6, at 95-96 (describing a subordinate's complicity with a
partner's obvious perjury to a federal judge).
81.

DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 104-47 (1988) (describing

and criticizing this view); Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5
HUM. RTs. 1, 3-4 (1975) (same).
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arguably legal conduct as part of their job as an advocate (factor five).
Thus, subordinates, such as the associate in the discovery example, will
view the authority's instructions as part of the agreement to help the
client, with the mindset of role-differentiation only adding to the belief
that any moral consequences are not the subordinate's primary
82
concern.
The effect that role has on judgment is nicely illustrated by a study
involving 139 auditors at major accounting firms. The auditors were
given hypothetical accounting scenarios and asked to assess the
accounting in each situation.83 Roughly half of the accountants were
asked to assume that they were retained by the firm that they were
auditing, while the rest were supposed to assume that they had been
hired by an outside investor who was considering making an investment
84
in the company. On average, the auditors were significantly more
likely to find that the company's financial reports complied with
generally accepted accounting standards when they played the role of the
company's accountant than when they played the role of the investor's
accountant.85 Their assigned roles, in other words, heavily influenced
their perspectives.
Another factor that contributes to obedience is that attorney
misbehavior will typically affect victims who are more remote in time
and place than the victims in Milgram's experiments (factor six). For
example, the failure to produce a smoking gun document will affect an
adverse party, but in a much more indirect way than the application of an
electric shock. Similarly, assisting a company's financial fraud (e.g., the
Enron scandal) will primarily harm shareholders and lower level
employees, people with whom lawyers have little contact.86 Because a

82. See generally ZIMBARDO, supra note 21 (describing his well-known Stanford Prison
Experiments, in which he demonstrated the substantial impact that social role has on behavior); see
also Kim, supra note 6, at 1012 (making a similar point); David Luban, Integrity: Its Causes and
Cures, 72 FORDHAM L. REv. 279, 292-93 (2003) (reviewing the social psychology literature,
including Professor Zimbardo's work, that highlights the extent to which role influences behavior).
83. Id. at 1009-10 (citing Don A. Moore et al., Conflict of Interest and the Unconscious
Intrusion of Bias (Harv. Bus. Sch. Negotiations, Orgs. & Mkts. Unit, Working Paper No. 02-40,
2002)).
84. Id. at 1009.
85. Id. at 1009-10; see also ROSs & NISBETT, supra note 3, at 72-75 (describing partisans'
inability to view a given situation objectively); Linda Babcock et al., Biased Judgments of Fairness
in Bargaining,85 AM. EcON. REV. 1337, 1339-42 (1995) (finding that lawyers' assessment of the
value of a case varies dramatically depending on which side they are assigned to represent);
Langevoort, supra note 73, at 95-111.
86. Kim, supranote 6, at 1033 (making this point in the context of securities fraud).
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lawyer will perceive these harms to be less immediate and proximate
than someone suffering painful electric shocks in an adjoining room, this
factor favors obedience in the lawyering context even more strongly than
what Milgram found in many of his experiments.
Not only will the victims of legal misconduct be relatively remote,
but the person issuing the orders will be nearby. Milgram found that
obedience increased when the authority figure and the subordinate were
in the same room and decreased when the experimenter issued orders
using a tape recorder or from another location. 87 For lawyers, the
authority figure who issues the instruction will typically be a colleague
or a client with whom the subordinate has a great deal of contact and
who may exercise considerable power regarding the subordinate's future
at the firm,
thus further adding to the likelihood of obedience (factor
88
seven).

Subordinates may also discount their responsibility for their
conduct (factor eight) by shifting moral responsibility to the person
issuing the orders. Indeed, when Milgram's subjects asked who was
responsible for what happened in the laboratory, the experimenter said
that he (the experimenter) was ultimately responsible for any harm to the
learner. 89 This shifting of responsibility is especially likely in the legal
ethics context, where Model Rule 5.2(b) states that "[a] subordinate
lawyer does not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer
acts in accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of
an arguable question of professional duty." 90 Given the ambiguity of so
many legal and ethical duties, subordinates will frequently find that a
supervisory lawyer's instructions reflect a "reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty." 9 1 Thus, subordinate lawyers are
likely to believe that responsibility for their actions ultimately lies with
superiors.
Another significant factor that contributed to obedience in
Milgram's subjects was the incremental nature of the experiment (factor
nine).92 Each new shock was only modestly larger than the last, making
it difficult for subjects to distinguish morally what they were about to do
from what they had already done.9 3 This phenomenon of justifying past
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

MILGRAM, supra note 32, at 59-62.
Kim, supra note 6, at 1003-04, 1011 (making a similar observation).
MILGRAM, supra note 32, at 7-8.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2007).
See Luban, supra note 57, at 5 (making a similar point).
MILGRAM, supra note 32, at 20-21.
Id. at 149; see also Luban, supra note 57, at 8.
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actions in a way that makes conduct of a similar type in the future seem
ethical is known as cognitive dissonance.94 In Milgram's experiment, it
meant that obedience was more likely at higher voltages because
subjects had already complied with shocks at lower voltages.9 5
In one of the few articles to describe in detail the implications of
Milgram's work for legal ethics, Professor David Luban contends that
the incremental nature of the experiment offers the best explanation for
the obedience that Milgram observed. 96 Luban explains that "[b]y luring
us into higher and higher level shocks, one micro-step at a time, the
Milgram experiments gradually and subtly disarm our ability to
distinguish right from wrong. 9 7
Professor Luban is clearly right that obedience in Milgram's
experiments occurred, in part, because the experimenter made seemingly
benign initial requests followed by gradually larger requests for
punishment.98 Nevertheless, the incremental nature of the experiment
probably did not play the decisive role that Luban suggests. Although
each step up on the shock generator was only fifteen volts, subjects did
not experience each step in precisely the same way. In fact, some of the
shocks were meaningfully different from the shocks that had come
before. For example, the learner eventually requested to be let go at 150
volts, making any additional shocks quite different in effect. Indeed,
when subjects resisted Milgram's commands, more did so at this point in
the experiment than at any other time. 99 Moreover, the learner's
complaints about heart pain and his subsequent ominous silence made
additional shocks clearly distinguishable from the shocks that the
subjects had already administered. Thus, cognitive dissonance and the
incremental nature of the experiment were important, but clearly not the
only-or even the primary-factors.
In fact, Professor Luban offers an example that illustrates the
limited explanatory force of increments. In the famous Berkey-Kodak

94.

Luban, supranote 57, at 8.

95. MILGRAM, supranote 32, at 149.
96. Luban, supranote 6, at 103.
97. Id.Professor Luban also pointed out how this force can affect law practice, such as in the
discovery context. He explained that an initial attempt to avoid producing a document can lead to
more and increasingly problematic attempts to resist the production of relevant information, leading
ultimately to the type of situation described in the initial hypothetical. Id. at 106.
98. MILGRAM, supranote 32, at 20-21.
99. Id. at 35-37 (noting that in this version of the experiment, five of the fifteen people who
disobeyed the experimenter did so at 150 volts, the point at which the "learner" demanded to be let
go); see also DORIS, supra note 7, at 50 (making a similar observation).
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case, an associate failed to report the blatant lying of a respected senior
colleague. l00 Luban contends that the associate's obedience reflected the
kind of incremental "corruption-of-judgment" that produced obedience
in Milgram's experiments.' 0' Namely, the associate's loyalty to his lying
superior was the "end of a slippery slope, beginning with lawful
and culminating with lies, perjury, and wrongful
adversarial ' deception
10 2
obedience."
The problem is that, even if a contentious discovery process had
preceded the lying, there is quite a leap from engaging in contentious
discovery to helping a partner lie to a federal judge. The Berkey-Kodak
case, according to Professor Luban's own account, involves a large jump
on the legal ethics equivalent of the shock generator from a small shock
to a potentially lethal one. Such a jump is not consistent with Luban's
contention that subordinates follow orders as a result of a gradual
corruption of judgment. Of course, increments play a role in excessive
Berkeyobedience, but such obedience can readily occur in cases like
103
Kodak without increments, assuming other forces are present.
Social prestige (factor ten) is another of those forces. 10 4 Many law
firms, especially larger firms, are held in high esteem among lawyers.
These firms are thus likely to produce the same social forces that Yale
University produced in Milgram's subjects.105 Moreover, smaller firms

100. Luban, supra note 57, at 4.
101. Id.at 9.
102. Id.
103. Professor Luban also argues that "[t]he Achilles' heel of situationism is explaining why
anyone deviates from the majority behavior." Luban, supranote 6, at 101; Luban, supra note 82, at
295-96 (making a similar point). In fact, this Achilles' heel can only be found on a straw man
version of situationism. Situationists do not claim that context fully explains all human behavior or
that everyone will act the same way in the same situation. DORIS, supranote 7, at 25 (asserting that
neither he nor any situationist he knows of maintains that "correlations between measurable
id.at 46 (acknowledging
dimensions of situations and single behaviors typically approach 1.0");
that dispositional differences provide a partial explanation for why some people did not comply
with the experimenter's commands in Milgram's experiments). Rather, situationists make more
modest claims, such as that dispositional traits are far less important than most people realize and
that context is a much more significant determinant of human behavior than people typically
believe. Id. at 24-25.
104. MILGRAM, supra note 32, at 66-70 (noting a reduction in obedience from sixty-five
percent to forty-eight percent when the study was moved from Yale to a rundown office building
that had no apparent ties to the University). But see supranote 75.
105. MILGRAM, supranote 32, at 66-70.
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469

can also produce the same effect,
especially if the superior is an
06
experienced and respected partner.'
Finally, the partner in the example is the only person to offer an
opinion, so the subordinate has not heard any dissent regarding the
partner's interpretation. The absence of dissent (factor eleven) is yet
10 7
another force that favors obedience.
In addition to the factors that contributed to obedience in Milgram's
experiment, there is one factor that favors obedience in the lawyer
situation that did not exist for Milgram: professional and financial selfinterest. 108 In Milgram's experiments, subjects were told that they could
keep the modest amount of money that they had been given, even if they
refused to continue with the experiment. 10 9 Moreover, their professional
fortunes were in no way affected by whether they complied. In contrast,
a subordinate lawyer has a lot to lose by refusing to obey: a job. The
subordinate's concern for her job, particularly a junior lawyer who may
have had few other professional opportunities, is likely to be substantial.
Thus, this factor also weighs heavily in favor of compliance and
suggests that lawyers might be even more likely to comply than the
subjects of Milgram's experiments.
There is, however, one factor that weighs against the hypothetical
lawyer's compliance: obedience could lead to monetary sanctions or
disbarment. If the lawyer believes that she faces a real chance of
discipline, she arguably would be more likely to resist the partner's
demands. The powerful concern for professional survival might trump
the other social forces that favor obedience and conformity and make
compliance less likely than in Milgram's experiments, where subjects
had no equivalent incentive to dissent.

106. Luban himself offers a nice description of this phenomenon in the context of the BerkeyKodak case, see Luban, supra note 6, at 95-96, though he does not ultimately identify it as a force
that could impact the associate's behavior independently of his corruption ofjudgment theory.
107. See, e.g., Kim, supra note 6, at 1021 (making this point in the in-house counsel context);
see also Ross & NISBETr, supra note 3, at 41 (explaining why people who witness, or find
themselves in, a potentially dangerous situation will fail to act if other people also fail to do so).
There are, of course, many other forces that contribute to obedience that were not part of Milgram's
experiment. For example, a superior can increase obedience by demeaning the intended victim.
MILGRAM, supra note 32, at 9. Thus, the common tendency among lawyers to demonize an
opponent or the opponent's lawyers makes it more likely that a subordinate will carry out an
unethical command that adversely affects that opponent.
108. Kim, supranote 6, at 1027 (describing this self-serving bias).
109. See MILGRAM, supra note 32, at 14-15 (showing the newspaper announcement that was
used to recruit subjects).
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There are three problems with this view. First, it assumes that the
subordinate will recognize that the partner's demands implicate her
ethical duties. The reality is that, given the forces at work, she may
easily begin to question her initial opinion and view the partner's
opinion as, at the very least, justifiable.' 10 This tendency to interpret the
situation so that it does not implicate one's ethical or moral
responsibility is sometimes called ethical fading.'11 Specifically, the
actor reinterprets the situation in such a way that the ethical nature of the
situation fades from view. If the subordinate does not even identify the
ethics issue, the concern for professional survival cannot override the
social forces favoring conformity and obedience.
Second, even if the subordinate recognizes the ethical dilemma, she
is not likely to be terribly concerned about discipline. Rule 5.2 only
imposes discipline if the superior's instructions were clearly unethical.
So unless the instruction is blatantly impermissible, the subordinate is
not likely to fear any disciplinary consequences.
Third, even if the instruction is blatantly unethical or illegal, a
lawyer may still not fear discipline, at least in the discovery context. Bar
discipline for this sort of misconduct occurs rarely, and sanctions are
usually far 2below what would be necessary to discourage this sort of
behavior."
The case of Washington State Physician Insurance Exchange &
Associates v. Fisons Corp. is illustrative.11 3 The original plaintiff in that
case was a child who had suffered seizures and permanent brain damage
after taking medicine that Fisons manufactured.' 14 The plaintiff's
discovery requests called for all documents related to a particular
110. Luban, supra note 6, at 95-96 (describing this phenomenon in the context of the BerkeyKodak case).
111. Ann E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: The Role of Self-Deception in
Unethical Behavior, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 223, 224-25 (2004); see also Kim, supra note 6, at 1026-29

(citing additional studies that have reached a similar conclusion); Luban, supra note 82, at 280
(observing that "hundreds of experiments reveal that when our conduct clashes with our prior
beliefs... our beliefs swing into conformity with our conduct, without our ever noticing").
112.

See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV.

505, 572-73 (2000) (noting the general reluctance of courts to refer discovery violations to
disciplinary authorities); Bruce A. Green, PolicingFederalProsecutors:Do Too Many Regulators
Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69, 90 (1995) (citing COMMISSION ON
EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF

DELEGATES 36 (1991)). It is too early to tell whether the recent sanctions for discovery abuses in
the recent high profile case of Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B, 2008 WL

66932, at *13 n.10 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), will have any impact on lawyers' behavior.
113.
114.

858 P.2d 1054 (Wash. 1993).
Id. at 1058.
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ingredient in the medicine and any information that Fisons had about
that ingredient's dangerousness in children.1 15 Despite these requests, the
defense lawyers relied on a contorted and frivolous rationale for not
turning over documents that proved that Fisons knew about the
ingredient's toxicity in children.116
After an anonymous copy of the smoking gun emerged, the trial
court considered and rejected any sanctions against the company or its
lawyers. 117 The trial court relied heavily on the notion that "the conduct
of the drug company and its counsel was consistent with the customary
and accepted litigation practices of the bar of [the county] and of
[Washington] state." 118 The Washington Supreme Court reversed that
determination, 19 but the ultimate sanction for the lawyers was an out-ofcourt settlement of a mere $325,000,120 a small fraction of the fees that
the firm had generated from the case. Put simply, the defense lawyers
received a slap on the wrist for a rather blatant discovery violation that
was similar to the one in the initial hypothetical.
Finally, the risks of sanctions and discipline are no higher (and may
be lower) than the risks associated with making the report. Many
lawyers in this circumstance would be concerned not only about losing
their current jobs, but about whether a report of this sort might make it
difficult to get jobs in the future once they were labeled as
whistleblowers.
To summarize, the hypothetical associate faces considerable
pressures to conform and obey and few risks from compliance and
obedience. Even if the misconduct is uncovered, a risk that may be
rather small, she is unlikely to face any punishment that will adversely
affect her career. The ultimate and disturbing result is that she is prone to
obey the partner who has issued the unethical and illegal command.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LAW OF LAWYERING

The challenge for legal ethicists is to counter the social forces that
contribute to excessive conformity and obedience. In one of the few
efforts to address that challenge, Professor Luban has suggested that, by
educating lawyers about their own tendencies to obey authorities, they
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 1080-83.
Id. at 1079-84.
Id. at1074-75.
Id. at 1078.
Id. at 1085.
Stuart Taylor, Jr., Sleazy in Seattle, AM. LAW., Apr. 1994, at 5, 5.
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might be better able to resist an order to commit illegal or unethical
conduct.121 Unfortunately, there is little evidence that this so-called
"enlightenment effect" holds much promise, at least in this particular
122
context.
There are some steps, however, that might make a difference in
some cases. Rather than offering an exhaustive list of potential remedies,
the following proposals are illustrations of how social psychology
could
23
play a more active role in debates about professional regulation.
A.

Providing Whistleblower Protectionsfor Attorneys

Currently, some states do not offer whistleblower protections for
lawyers. 124 In those jurisdictions, lawyers who are fired after disclosing
illegal conduct have no legal recourse against their employers. This lack
of whistleblower protection is unwise, given that it reinforces the already
125
strong social forces that weigh against defiance in such circumstances.
The problem is amply illustrated by the well-known Illinois case,
Balla v. Gambro, Inc. ,126 in which Gambro's general counsel, Mr. Balla,
learned that his company was selling dialyzers for dialysis machines that
were not within federal specifications and that could cause potentially
serious medical complications. 127 After Balla unsuccessfully urged
121. Luban, supra note 6, at 116 ("Perhaps the best protection [for lawyers against the forces
described in Milgram's experiments] is understanding the.., insidious way [those forces] work on
us.");
see also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 31, 47
(1992) (suggesting that exposure to Milgram's work might help law students avoid unethical
behavior).
122. Thomas Blass, The Milgram ParadigmAfter 35 Years: Some Things We Now Know About
Obedience to Authority, in OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE MILGRAM
PARADIGM 35, 50-53 (Thomas Blass ed., 2000) (drawing on several studies and concluding that
"[b]eing enlightened about the unexpected power of authority may help a person stay away from an
authority-dominated situation, but once he or she is already in such a situation, knowledge of the
drastic degree of obedience authorities are capable of eliciting does not necessarily help free the
individual from the grip of the forces operating in that concrete situation"). Despite this lack of
evidence, I share Professor Luban's intuition that enlightening lawyers about this tendency is
worthwhile. I show my students a video of the Milgram experiments on the last day of class in the
hope that it might make some difference at some point in their professional lives.
123. For an excellent analysis of social psychology's implications for the regulation of lawyers
who represent publicly traded companies, see Kim, supranote 6, at 1034-75.
124. See, e.g., Balla v. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 107 (I1. 1991).
125. Kim, supra note 6, at 1042-44, 1064-71 (arguing that securities lawyers should receive
whistleblower protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for reasons similar to those described here);
Douglas R. Richmond, Professional Responsibilities of Law Firm Associates, 45 BRANDEIS L.J.
199, 257 (2007) (arguing in favor of whistleblower protection for lawyers).
126. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 104.
127. Id. at 106.
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Gambro not to put the dialyzers on the market, Gambro fired Balla. 12 8
Balla subsequently revealed the defects to the Federal Food and Drug
Administration and sued
for retaliatory discharge under the state's
29
statute.'
whistleblower
The Illinois Supreme Court rejected Balla's claim, explaining that
whistleblower statutes exist to protect employees who might otherwise
be reluctant to report corporate malfeasance. 130 The court's primary
rationale was that, since lawyers in Illinois already had an ethical
obligation to report misconduct like the selling of the defective
dialyzers, Mr. Balla did not need whistleblower protection. 3 '
On its face, the Illinois Supreme Court's logic is sound. If the
whistleblower statute is unclear regarding its application to lawyers and
if the purpose of the statute would not be furthered by applying it to
attorneys, Balla should not receive protection.
The problem is that the court's opinion rested on a flawed
assumption about human behavior. Social psychology suggests that
lawyers in Balla's situation would find it difficult to disclose
information of the sort described in the opinion, especially without
whistleblower protection. First, lawyers like Balla are unlikely to put
much stock in the ethical obligation that the court referenced. The rule is
ambiguous, and the various forces described earlier can lead a lawyer to
interpret the rule as not requiring disclosure. Moreover, there are very
few instances where lawyers have been disciplined for failing to disclose
information under similar circumstances. Thus, any fear of discipline
would be overshadowed by what the lawyer had to lose (i.e., a job) by
reporting the misconduct and by other situational forces, such as Balla's
distance from the prospective victims, his proximity to his bosses, the
hierarchical structure of a corporation, and the presumptive absence of
dissent.
Balla's refusal to comply given these variables was notable (and
one of the reasons the case is so widely reported), but there is no reason
to think that his response was typical. Given similar circumstances,
lawyers will face considerable pressure to conceal a client's harmful
conduct and to develop legal justifications for that concealment. The
reality, in other words, is that lawyers-like most people-face
significant social pressures that make it difficult to resist a client's
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 108.
Id.at 108-09.
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insistence on harmful and potentially illicit courses of conduct, even if a
duty to report exists. Justice Freeman, in his dissent, stated this point
convincingly:
[T]o say that the categorical nature of ethical obligations is sufficient
to ensure that the ethical obligations will be satisfied simply ignores
reality. Specifically, it ignores that, as unfortunate for society as it may
be, attorneys are no less human than nonattomeys and, thus, no less
given to the temptation to either ignore or rationalize away their ethical
obligations when complying therewith may render them unable to feed
and support their families.
I would like to believe, as my colleagues apparently conclude, that
attorneys will always "do the right thing" because the law says that
they must. However, my knowledge of human nature, which is not
much greater than the average layman's, and, sadly, the recent scandals
involving the bench and bar of Illinois are more than sufficient to
dispel such a belief. Just as the ethical obligations of the lawyers and
judges involved in those scandals were inadequate to ensure that they
would not break the law, I am afraid that the lawyer's ethical
obligation to "blow the whistle" is likewise an inadequate safeguard
for the public policy of protecting lives and property of Illinois
citizens.
As reluctant as I am to concede it, the fact is that this court must
take whatever steps it can, within the bounds of the law, to give
lawyers incentives to abide by their ethical obligations, beyond the
satisfaction inherent in their doing so. We cannot continue to delude
ourselves and the people of the State of Illinois that attorneys' ethical
duties, alone, are always sufficient to guarantee that lawyers will "do
the right thing." In the context of this case, where doing "the right
thing" will often result in termination by an employer bent on doing
the "wrong thing," I believe that the incentive needed is recognition
of
32
a cause of action for retaliatory discharge, in the appropriate case.'
Justice Freeman got it exactly right. The court should have
acknowledged how human beings are likely to behave, discounted the
ethical obligation to disclose, and affirmed the value of whistleblower
protection. Of course, the existence of whistleblower protection will not
ensure that all lawyers reveal information about a client's illicit actions,
but such protection could make a difference in some cases by weakening
the significant psychological forces that weigh against such disclosures.

132.

Id. at 113 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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B. Enforcing the Duty to Report Misconduct
Most states impose on attorneys a duty to report another lawyer's
misconduct if the misconduct implicates
the lawyer's trustworthiness,
1 33
honesty, or fitness to practice law.
The problem with the rule is that most lawyers, especially
subordinates, are not eager to report the misconduct of other attorneys.
For instance, the associate in the discovery example may find it difficult
to report the partner, even if she were convinced that the partner had
engaged in an intentional and egregious discovery violation that
reflected on the partner's trustworthiness or honesty. 134 As Part III
explained, the subordinate is likely to feel considerable pressure to obey
the authority figure and to be complicit in the authority's misconduct. It
would take an unusual subordinate to not only resist that
temptation, but
135
to take the next step of reporting the superior to the bar.
Part of the problem is that Rule 8.3, like the disclosure duty in
Illinois, is rarely enforced. The vast majority of states do not have 136a
single reported case where a lawyer was disciplined under this rule.
As a result, lawyers are willing to run the very negligible risk of
discipline in order to avoid having to report another attorney to the bar.
One potential solution is to increase enforcement of the rule so that
lawyers perceive a greater threat to their own professional well-being if
they fail to report the misconduct of other attorneys under Model Rule
8.3. Indeed, Illinois's experience with this rule suggests that modest
increases in enforcement can have a discernable effect on reporting.
After the Illinois Supreme Court issued an opinion that disciplined a
lawyer under Rule 8.3,
Illinois's bar disciplinary
authorities observed
138
a substantial increase in Rule 8.3 reports.
The increase in Illinois implies that the fear of discipline can
prompt lawyers to report misconduct that they otherwise would have

133.

MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2007).

134. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 6, at 95 (describing an associate's failure to report a partner's
obvious perjury in a well-known case).
135. See Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190, 1192-93 (2d Cir. 1974)
(describing the actions of a junior associate who resigned from his firm and reported the firm's
misconduct to the Securities and Exchange Commission).
136. See Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do When Nobody's Watching: Legal Advertising as
a Case Study of the Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 999 &
n. 134 (2002) (noting the lack of enforcement of this rule).
137. In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 794-95 (I11.1988).
138. Leonard E. Gross, Legal Ethicsfor the Future: Time to Clean Up Our Act?, 77 ILL. B.J.
196, 198 n.26 (1988).
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swept under the rug. 139 Thus, increased enforcement of Rule 8.3 can also
help to weaken the social forces that would ordinarily encourage
lawyers, especially subordinate lawyers, to ignore perceived misconduct.
C. Strengtheningthe Responsibilitiesof SubordinateLawyers
Another Model Rule that impacts the conduct of subordinate
lawyers is, unsurprisingly, the rule written specifically for subordinate
lawyers-Rule 5.2. That rule states that "[a] subordinate lawyer does not
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in
accordance with a supervisory lawyer's reasonable resolution of an
arguable question of professional duty." 140 The rule essentially permits a
lawyer to carry out a superior's orders as long as those orders constitute
a reasonable interpretation of the relevant ethical obligation.
On its face, the rule makes sense. After all, why should a lawyer
face discipline for following the arguably ethical and legal orders of a
superior?
But as with the Balla decision, the rule rests on a questionable
assumption about human behavior. By allowing a lawyer to avoid
responsibility for "reasonable resolutions of an arguable question of
professional duty," the rule opens the door to interpreting a wide range
of instructions as "arguably" ethical. For example, the subordinate in the
discovery example is likely to understand her ethical obligations through
the distorted prism of what the partner wants, leading her to construe the
discovery issue as "arguable" and the partner's resolution of it as
"reasonable." This tendency, referred to earlier as ethical fading,141
suggests that the typical subordinate attorney will conclude that Rule 5.2
applies and that she can carry out the partner's commands without fear
42
of professional discipline. 1
One possible solution is to repeal Rule 5.2(b) to make it clear that
subordinates have an independent duty to assess whether a particular
course of action is ethical and legal. 43 Of course, the "just following
139. Mary T. Robinson, A Lawyer's Duty to Report Another Lawyer's Misconduct: The Illinois
Experience, 2007 Symp. Issue PROF. LAW. 47, 49-50 (observing an increase in reporting after
Himmel); Patricia A. Sallen, Combating Himmel Angst, 2007 Symp. Issue PROF. LAW. 47, 49-50

(describing a similar phenomenon in Arizona).
140. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2007).
141. See supranote Ill and accompanying text.
142. See Luban, supranote 57, at 5 (making a similar point).
143. See Carol M. Rice, The Superior Orders Defense in Legal Ethics: Sending the Wrong
Message to Young Lawyers, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv..887, 931-34 (1997) (making a similar
proposal). But see Richmond, supra note 125, at 213 (endorsing Rule 5.2(b)).
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orders" defense could still be raised as a mitigating factor when
determining the appropriate punishment.) 4 But it should not allow a
lawyer to avoid discipline entirely. Indeed, such a defense is generally
rejected in most other contexts.145 Moreover, by putting subordinates on
notice that they have an independent duty to question a superior's orders,
subordinates would be less likely to assume that a superior's actions are
permissible and more likely to offer resistance to unethical or illegal
commands. 146
V.

CONCLUSION

More than forty years of research into social psychology has
revealed that, under certain conditions, we will conform to group
opinions and obey authorities who issue illegal instructions. If a majority
of people are willing to apply dangerous electric shocks to a bound older
man with a heart condition just because someone with a lab coat says so,
there is every reason to believe that lawyers will frequently obey their
superiors when instructed to perform unethical or illegal tasks.
By drawing on a tiny fraction of social psychology research, this
Article suggests some steps that the profession can take to weaken the
social forces that produce excessive obedience and conformity. These
suggestions, however, have important limitations, such as the problem of
ethical fading.1 47 Nevertheless, they hint at a much broader project, one
that draws on the very rich literature in social psychology to address
various causes of attorney misconduct.

144. See Rice, supra note 143, at 889 n.5, 912-14; see also Richmond, supranote 125, at 212.
145. See Rice, supra note 143, at 904-14.
146. Of course, this approach cannot counter the ethical fading phenomenon. A lawyer will
only consider reporting another lawyer if she recognizes the ethical issue.
147. See supranote 111 and accompanying text.
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